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To understand the magnitude of the Nuremberg Trials it is necessary 
to provide a brief background of the Holocaust and crimes that took 
place.  By 1933, when Hitler gained power, Jews were encouraged to 
leave Germany and by 1938 many of the larger Jewish communities were 
no more.  The Jews who had chosen to stay were ridiculed and abused – 
only to become targets for Nazi propaganda.  The declaration of war in 
1939 resulted in the annexation of Poland whereupon Polish Jews were 
forced to live in ghettos with little access to food and other necessities.  
Those who were fit enough to survive the meager conditions were forced 
to work in labor camps.  Nearly 30,000 Jews had perished in 1941 from 
street massacres and work camps, while another 20,000 died from 
starvation in the ghettos (Chippendale 35).
A new policy was enacted in June of 1941 with the invasion of Russia 
to destroy entire communities of Jews.  An elite military unit known 
as the Waffen SS created special groups of soldiers, Einsatzgruppen, 
or “special killing forces” whose job was to “eliminate as many Jews as 
possible in the hundreds of small towns and villages throughout the 
conquered territories on the Eastern Front” (Chippendale 35).  Their 
plan of attack was to line up and shoot as many Jews as they could, 
but this soon proved to be inefficient.  Second to Hitler in the Nazi 
hierarchy was Hermann Göring, who commissioned the SS to “submit 
[…] promptly an overall plan showing the preliminary organizational, 
substantive and financial measures for the execution of the intended 
final solution of the Jewish question” (Chippendale 37).  In 1942, a 
new system of transporting Jews in trucks and pumping poisonous gas 
into the trucks proved more efficient.  Of those who were not gassed in 
trucks, many suffered the same fateful end via the gas chamber upon 
arriving at various concentration camps.  Those who were fit to work 
were not killed immediately but sentenced to work grueling jobs under 
horrific conditions.  By the end of World War II more than one third of 
the worldwide Jewish population, nearly six million men, women, and 
children, had been murdered by the Nazis. 
“The enormity of the crimes committed by the Germans in their 
attempt to render Europe Judenfrei (cleansed of Jews) is beyond 
the ability or the willingness of ethical people to accept” (Rice 10).  
Consequently, the results of the Holocaust left victims desperate for 
justice.  The Nazis, under Hitler’s rule, had committed mass killings 
and torturous experiments, had enslaved and forced labor upon 
individuals, ultimately leaving Europe in a state of complete disarray.  
Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the 
Soviet Union decided to bring to trial the most notable Nazi war 
criminals.  The charges ranged from conspiracy to crimes against peace, 
to war crimes, and perhaps most well known – crimes against humanity.  
The trial began on November 20, 1945, and lasted ten months.  On the 
second day of the trial, Justice Robert H. Jackson of the United States 
opened for the prosecution saying, “[…] That four great nations, flushed 
with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and 
voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is 
one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason” 
(Chippendale 42).  Throughout the trial, evidence was never hard to 
pinpoint and the revealed crimes against humanity as noted were the 
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against civilian populations, before or during the war; 
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of 
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated” (Peress 107).  Furthermore, it was maintained that crimes 
against humanity “fell within the province of international law if they 
were committed in preparation for or in connection with international 
war such as aggressive war and War Crimes. This restriction was so 
as to not infringe in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state merely 
on the grounds that it was offending against humanitarian principles” 
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(Calvocoressi 57-8).  
The defense’s claim was to emphasize that they were only following 
orders and should therefore not be charged with the associated crimes.  
More specifically, three claims were laid out for the defense: “1. Hitler 
and others were to blame for everything.  2.  The men on trial had no 
knowledge of the crimes that were committed.  3.  The laws by which 
they were being tried were ex post facto, or established after the fact.  
(In other words, the Germans had broken no laws because the laws did 
not exist until after their actions came to light.)”  (Chippendale 45).   Yet 
based upon the court’s ultimate decision, the defense was unable to win 
their case.  Thus it was decided that there exists a moral obligation to 
reject orders that constitute a crime against humanity (Chippendale 62).  
Additionally, it was deemed “neither manly nor true” that one person, 
Hitler, was responsible for the acts committed.  Thousands of men laid 
witness who had access to Hitler and often had the ability to control 
the information on which he based his policy and orders.  While many 
Nazis escaped trial, ten of the defendants were sentenced to hanging, 
seven were given prison sentences, and three were acquitted.  Prosecutor 
Whitney R. Harris said of the trials, “For the first time in history, the 
judicial process was brought to bear against those who had offended the 
conscience of humanity by committing the acts of military aggression and 
related crimes.” “[…] Crimes against humanity and initiating and waging 
of aggressive war are now judicial concepts” (Chippendale 46).  The 
Nuremberg Trials represented the first time that crimes against humanity 
were established in positive international law.  Since the Nuremberg 
trials aimed at attaining justice for crimes against humanity, I will show 
that they were justified in their hearings.  Because there is a higher 
order of law that all nations should adhere to, the trials were legitimate 
secondary to a defiance of natural law.
It is necessary to provide an outline for the basis of natural law 
as divine law in addition to international law before correlating the 
application of the Nuremberg Trials.  While it need not always be the 
case, natural law is often grounded in religious beliefs.  It is the law 
of the universe, the overarching backdrop to every action made in the 
cosmos, and the standard against which all national laws are judged.  The 
universality of natural law provides the basis for something that is “right” 
or “wrong” regardless of country or legal system.  There exist three types 
of law: jus naturale, jus gentium, and jus civile.  Jus naturale, as has 
been explained, is the natural law – existing by nature to all animals.  Jus 
gentium is the law applied to strangers, and jus civile is the law applied 
to citizens of a particular place.  It is necessary to declare a distinction 
between jus gentium and jus civile because not all laws apply to citizens 
everywhere in the same fashion.  Because of this, laws must be enacted 
to keep the peace between strangers and citizens.  Natural law ultimately 
applies to all men.  Jus naturale is something God himself cannot 
change once it has been established.  For philosophers who don’t feel 
comfortable with founding legal theory in God, they may contest that 
reason is an innate faculty like our physical senses.  In other words, the 
foundation for jus naturale could reside in a sense of reason existing 
within humans instead of through God.  Theists would argue that natural 
law is promulgated in our consciences by God, while atheists would argue 
that we identify natural law through reason.
To demonstrate an understanding of natural law practice, let us 
examine the traditions and theory of St. Thomas Aquinas.  Allow us to 
assume that Aquinas is correct in his notion that God grants within us a 
conscience with which we are to promulgate the law.  Aquinas holds that 
a law is an ordering of reason.  This makes sense within his framework 
because reason comes from God, who established the divine or natural 
law.  Therefore, we are to align ourselves according to the divine law 
by using our God-given conscience to order God’s law into applicable 
rules for our lives.  Laws must be for the common good because they are 
for the entire community.  Reason would not have us make a law that 
only benefited certain groups just as God did not make the world only 
hospitable to certain humans, animals, plants, etc.  The “end” of a law is 
to bring a “good” to the community in its entirety whether it be peace, 
order, etc.  The law must be made public by the caretakers.  This follows 
from Aquinas’s proclamation that God, the caretaker of the universe, 
promulgated his law to humans through conscience.  Without such 
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announcement, a law cannot be a law, for its purpose is to bring good to 
a community.  How can it bring good if it is not known?  Aquinas would 
say that it could not.  (Bubacz)
An abhorrent of divine-natural law theory is Grotius, who founded 
a law superior to all nations – thus establishing a communal standard 
outside of a religious belief.  Grotius defined natural law as stemming 
from reason, which cannot be changed by God himself, rather than 
from divine order.  The overarching principles of Grotius’s ideas present 
themselves in the order of international relations.  His ideas aim to 
bring nations together, uniting everyone with the same responsibilities 
for behavior.  Even if one is hesitant to associate God as the deliverer of 
natural law, s/he can still see the Nuremberg Trials as just in that natural 
law was disobeyed.   (Bubacz)
Those who would tend to reject the justification of the Nuremberg 
Trials would likely ground their reasoning in a rejection of natural law.  
Why might one reject natural law theory?  One of the central difficulties 
with natural law is that it surrounds the question “who is the law giver?”  
This of course would have to be God, the only being that supersedes all 
else.  A problem automatically arises if one does not feel comfortable 
rooting a legal theory in God.  Another problem of natural law is “how” 
(assuming its existence) it is to be identified.  If there is no God, seeking 
an answer to this question becomes very difficult.
One philosopher who does not believe in God is Thomas Hobbes.  
Hobbes’s theory is rooted in long-term self-preservation.  He would 
argue that the Nazis were aiming to preserve themselves; they were 
the sovereigns, the power.  Because they have no concept of “wrong” or 
“humanitarian laws,” Hobbes would argue that there is no point to a 
trial.  A trial is senseless because there is no law, no “right,” no “wrong.”  
If the sovereign ultimately wants the Nazi war criminals dead, then the 
sovereign should kill them.  If the sovereign wants to have a trial, a trial 
can be enacted for appealing purposes, but there is no basis for this.  A 
Hobbesian would argue that the Nazis didn’t violate any laws in the first 
place because no laws exist other than the laws dictated by the sovereign 
who is incapable of committing any crime.  Because the Nazis lost their 
role as sovereign by losing the war, a new sovereign is introduced who 
then provides the standard for a new set of “laws” (Kemerling 1). 
Utilitarians like John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham are also 
opponents to natural law theory.  These philosophers assume a 
consequentialist viewpoint, which places stress on the importance 
of weighing the consequences of actions based on the utility of those 
actions, utility here is related to some conception of what makes those 
actions useful and/or valuable to undertake.  Essentially nothing is 
intrinsically right or wrong (right or wrong simply because of the 
intentions behind the act); rightness and wrongness must be based on 
the sum effect of actions.  Also, the foundation of morality, therefore, is 
utility: actions are right that tend to promote happiness (pleasure and 
absence of pain), wrong if they tend toward the opposite (unhappiness – 
pain and the privation of pleasure).  Pleasure and freedom of pain are the 
only things desirable as ends; they are intrinsically good.  In regards to 
the assessment of overall well-being, Bentham argues that utilitarianism 
deals with quantitative assessment of pain and pleasure.  We need to 
employ a “hedonistic calculus” when making ethical assessments of 
well-being.  Mill, on the other hand notes that there exists qualitative 
differences of which we ought to take account when making ethical 
assessments of well-being.  To say that Mill and Bentham would be in 
support of the crimes committed in the Holocaust is unfair; however, the 
creed they are suggesting we follow would justify the actions of the Nazis. 
(Bubacz)
All of these opponents, Hobbes, Mill, and Bentham, are relativists.  
They believe in ends, which ultimately define their morality and which 
lead to immorality because there is nothing intrinsically good or evil; it 
begs the question, how does this meet my personal end?  If no act is good 
in and of itself, if it is only good as an instrument to a means, then the act 
has no intrinsic value.  This way of thought leads to relativism because 
it is impossible to predict the future or accurately define the good for 
another person or oneself; human beings are not omniscient.  This leads 
to a picking and choosing of potential outcomes one wishes to examine.  
A morally valid act for one person has the ability to become a morally 
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invalid act for another person, yet both cannot be correct.  Because there 
is no standard by which to judge these acts, the examination and the 
moral validity or invalidity becomes relative.  The problem with moral 
relativism is that relativists can’t accuse others of wrongdoing, just as 
they can’t complain about evil.  They can’t demand justice and fairness 
and they cannot promote the obligation of tolerance (Relativism para. 5).
In response to these rejections, it seems odd that positivists (those 
most likely to object to natural law) do in fact object to overriding 
moral principles.  Generally speaking, positivists claim to found their 
morality in scientific observations of human behavior.  Morality is just a 
convention – we say things are right and wrong based upon the ends.  It 
seems strange that they would fail to notice that all of nature is governed 
by superseding laws that place restrictions on all activity in the universe.  
Why should human behavior be any different?
Despite the existence of alternative theories to natural law, as 
presented by Hobbes, Mill, and Bentham, such theories do not override 
the elements presented in natural law theory.  As natural law pertains 
to the Nuremberg Trials, its theory commits an international basis of 
moral law.  Natural law is objective in that it provides a standard to work 
with – the ends don’t justify the means.  No one is asked to predict the 
future, read minds, or do anything humanly incapable to determine the 
moral status of an action.  Acts are based on principle, not utility.  The 
Nazis defied these principles, and were thus punished for the crimes they 
wrongfully committed.  Reasons for the existence of punishment are 
vast – to change people, to express society’s dissatisfaction of particular 
behavior, to set aside wrongdoing individuals from others, etc.  The 
punishment fared by the Nazis was likely a result of all of the above 
reasons; it was necessary to hold the trials in order to solidify a sense 
of nationalism and unity.  The trials also functioned to display a public, 
outward sense of discordance by the governments of sundry nations.
The trials were able to give rise to many changes in regards to 
international law.  Crimes against humanity have since been deemed a 
part of jus cogens – “the highest standing in international legal norms 
[…] [constituting] a non-derogable rule of international law” (Peress 
108).  This association requires committers of such acts to be subject 
to universal jurisdiction, in that each state may exercise jurisdiction 
regardless of where the crime was committed.  It is interesting to note 
that everyone is held to the same expectation – no sovereign is allowed 
to escape these parameters.  Peress writes, “[…] no one is immune from 
prosecution for such crimes, even a head of state” (108).  The definition 
of a crime against humanity has since been updated since the time of 
the trials to include forms of torture that have more recently plagued 
humanity, such as rape and forced pregnancy.  New legislation has since 
been created to identify differences between crimes against humanity, 
and genocide.  Crimes against humanity “do not require an intent to 
‘destroy in whole or in part,’ […] but only target a given group and carry 
out a policy of ‘widespread or systematic’ violations’” (Peress 108).  
Crimes against humanity are also distinguishable in that they may be 
committed in times of war or times of peace.
To recapitulate my thesis (as an argument for the justification of 
the Nuremberg trials in response to actions that defied natural law) the 
necessary groundwork and interpretations both outlining and opposing 
the stance have been made.  My interpretation of natural law answers 
the deficiencies found in the other theories presented.  Natural law 
provides condemnation for acts that were lawfully committed.  To say 
that the Nazis’ acts were justified because there weren’t any prohibitive 
laws in Germany is not only unacceptable but screams of immorality: 
an immorality that led to the massacre of nearly an entire population.  
Such moral justification is deplorable.  I must on these principles reject 
any relative claim to morality.  The Nuremberg Trials clearly depict the 
error in accepting positivist claims about morality and they provide clear 
foresight into the sanctioned acts of such governments.  Unfortunately, 
it took a grievous, extreme situation like the Holocaust to demonstrate 
the flawed nature of positivist claims.  Their claims naturally lead to a 
slippery slope situation where the concepts of the right and wrong are 
continually put at variance with selfish motives.  Those motives find 
justification within the premise of utility.  I hope that this occurrence 
never repeats itself in history; however, our false idea of tolerance leads 
HEMBREE / THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
¤ LUCERNA ¤98 99
to the illusion of distance between ourselves and other human beings.  
This distance leads to extreme immorality and we as humans have to 
ask ourselves – is this the type of world in which we want to live?  I will 
choose to accept as my creed beliefs that value life in and of itself.  
Are human beings not capable of empathy?  When I see the photos of 
Holocaust victims in pages upon pages of these books I cannot help but 
feel that there has to be something more than the pursuit of our ends.  To 
ignore this is to strip ourselves of being human.  This intuition tells me 
that there is some commonality amongst human beings. I feel a person’s 
pain when I see these photos and to deny those feelings would be to 
distance myself from morality.  I find it hard to believe that someone 
could examine these photographs of walking, living, breathing skeletons, 
of babies piled in heaps and women and children waiting in line for 
the gas chambers and not be moved to tears.  This is how we know that 
something binds us together as human beings.  There is a reason why I 
feel for these people; an indefinable relationship exists.  While the events 
of the Holocaust occurred long before my lifetime, I still suffer when I 
see depictions of the horrific event.  In his final assessment of the trials, 
Henry Stimson writes in his essay “Nuremberg: Landmark in Law,”
We must never forget that under modern conditions of life, science 
and technology, all war has become greatly brutalized, and that no 
one who joins in it, even in self-defense can escape becoming also in a 
measure brutalized.  […] A standard has been raised to which Americans, 
at least, must repair, for it is only as this standard is accepted, supported 
and enforced that we can move onward to a world of law and peace 
(Marrus 244-5).  
The more I research and come to learn, the less I distance myself 
from the events that took place.   This is beyond convention.  I feel that 
these actions were wrong in and of themselves without regard to their 
ends, which implies that there is more to morality than strict utility.  
There are absolute connections that bind us to each other, and with those 
connections come law(s) that can’t be violated.
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